> My feeling is they would all act as predatory as they felt they could
> get away with. So while MS has the industry locked up now, I'd like
> to look for solutions that a) won't just trade one tyrant for
> another, and b) doesn't rely on the company's altruism either.

Exactly. That's why I believe that if there is to be a new platform in the
space occupied by Java and .NET it must come from an entity that's so small
that no one will feel threatened by it.

This is one of the reasons why the Apache philosophy has worked so well.
Look at the stats. Developers feel comfortable investing in the Apache
platform.

Microsoft and Sun attract developers who are blind to the brick walls that
separate the platform vendor from the developers, or for some other reason
feel safe (for example they're VARs or inhouse developers, with specialities
or their own kind of user-level lock-in). For developers creating more
horizontal functionality, Microsoft and Sun have too much power and use it
too carelessly for them to feel comfortable investing alongside them.

Dave

PMFJI, but I'd like to make a contrast between the view of IBM
mentioned here and the one I grew up with -- granted that was 30-40
years ago, but it's still interesting.

IBM is mentioned here for having adopted the open source model and
backing that up in their actions. However, (I don't work in the
computer biz, my father did) I grew up cutting my teeth on the way
IBM had the lock on the biz at that time. Remember the infamous IBM
anti-trust trial? I recall him railing about how no other vendor
stood a chance because of IBM's propietary standards.

I think it's fascinating that the market has brought them to an open
source stance now. And, I wonder how well they would stay with that
position were MS to suddenly fall off the face of the earth. Or, for
that matter, how would HP, Sun, etc., all react if MS dropped off the
earth?

My feeling is they would all act as predatory as they felt they could
get away with. So while MS has the industry locked up now, I'd like
to look for solutions that a) won't just trade one tyrant for
another, and b) doesn't rely on the company's altruism either.

Later...
--
David Goggin
  -- david.goggin@...

--- In breaking-windows@y..., "Gerhard Poul" <gpoul@c...> wrote:
> > a daily basis. I like freedom of choice. Microsoft doesn't,
because their
> > whole business model comes from 2 key points: milking their two
> > "cash cows"
> > (Windows and Office), and the forced upgrade cycles.
>
> IMHO this issue is also raised in "Breaking Windows" but I'd like
to discuss
> this whole issue.
>
> Is / in which sense is Java open?

Not being an expert, but from what I've seen - its more open in its
documentation, its availibility.

For instance, IBM has their own (IMO superior) JDK available.  Sun is
not using Java in an attempt to lock developers to the Solaris
platform - their programmers don't get secret API's that the rest of
the world doesn't.

> Do you think C# is more open?

No - because of the above.  Granted, a lot of it is previous track
record.  But C# is intended to lock developers and uses to one
platform.  Previously, Microsoft has then further hindered the
developers writing for them, when they wanted to compete, with
"hidden" APIs, or not fixing bugs that affected the competition, but
not Microsoft.

Java is defined, and then other people are free to attempt to
implement it (kaffe on Linux is another example).  HP is apparently
clean-rooming their own version, based on the published APIs.

That's how I consider it to be more open.

Addison

DaveNet essay, "Excerpt from Breaking Windows", released on 8/14/2001; 7:34:08
AM Pacific.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\
-----------------

***Introduction by Dave Winer

In April I received an invitation from Wall Street Journal reporter David Bank
to review his upcoming book about Microsoft, Breaking Windows, and of course I
said yes. I consume those kinds of books as part of a steady diet of
computer-related literature.

Books in this genre can be exhausting, often portraying the leaders of Microsoft
as inhuman heroes and geniuses; but Bank's book is different, more real, because
he tapped into a huge collection of emails from Microsoft executives that were
made public during the antitrust trial. That gave Breaking Windows a grounding
that no previous Microsoft treatise had. For the first time the humanity and
confusion comes out, in a sympathetic way, in the exact words of Bill Gates,
Steve Ballmer, Jim Allchin, Brad Silverberg, Brad Chase, David Cole, Ben Slivka,
Adam Bosworth and many others. You can see how events outside Microsoft were
shaped by people at the top levels of the company, in their own words.

Microsoft has long appeared to be a well-oiled machine, moving in lock-step
towards goals set by Bill Gates. In Breaking Windows, however, a different
picture emerges. The agony inside and around Microsoft is the theme of Bank's
fantastic book. I believe it's the most illuminating and important book you can
read in 2001 if you're part of the computer, software or Internet industry.

I asked for permission to run an excerpt, and the publisher, The Free Press,
graciously agreed. This section, pages 113-122, is crucial to the story. In this
excerpt Bank tells the story of Microsoft's decision to comply with a judge's
order to open up Windows to other browsers by breaking Windows, an act of
self-defacement that illustrates how far Microsoft will go before bending to
authority. I was at Microsoft the day this happened, and remember discussing it
with people there. A line was crossed for many of us in this event, and as you
will see, the line went through the top levels of Microsoft.

I've included pointers to further reading and a discussion group for the book at
the end of the piece. Now here's the excerpt from Breaking Windows by David
Bank.

***Excerpt from Breaking Windows, by David Bank

Gates's triumphant visit to China was interrupted by a call from Microsoft's
in-house antitrust lawyer, David Heiner. The news: U.S. District Court Judge
Thomas Penfield Jackson had sided with the government and ordered Microsoft to
stop tying its Internet Explorer browser to Windows. At a news conference in
China, Gates declined to comment on the case. He hurried home.

To Microsoft executives, the implications of the order were as foggy as the
Seattle weather that Thursday afternoon in December 1997. The good news was that
Jackson denied the government's request for a contempt citation. The consent
decree and Microsoft's behavior, he said, were both too ambiguous to support
such a ruling.

However, on his own, sua sponte, Jackson moved to enforce the 1995 consent
decree Microsoft had negotiated with the Justice Department and European
antitrust authorities. At issue was the section of the decree barring Microsoft
from forcing PC makers to take an "other product"-in this case, the browser-as a
condition of licensing Windows. For monopolies, this kind of "tying" is a no-no.
It is considered inherently anticompetitive. If customers genuinely wanted the
other product, there would be no need to force them; if they didn't want it,
they shouldn't be forced to take it in order to get the product they need.

Any ambiguity came from a proviso that had been negotiated into the 1995 consent
decree almost as an afterthought. Now the proviso became the heart of the
matter. The consent decree's anti-tying clause, the proviso clarified, "shall
not be construed to prohibit Microsoft from developing integrated products." The
loophole appeared to give Microsoft an out.

It was Gates himself who had insisted on the loophole in late-night negotiations
in 1994 with Joel Klein's predecessor as Clinton's  antitrust chief, Anne
Bingaman. In the talks, Microsoft's attorneys at first suggested a more limited
proviso to the anti-tying clause: Microsoft would not be prohibited from
developing integrated products "which offer technological advantages." But that
restriction was unacceptable to Gates, who refused to give bureaucrats the
authority to decide whether changes to Windows delivered such advantages; he
directed his lawyers to remove the last four words. Gates was emphatic that
Microsoft would not accept any limitations on its rights to design its products
as it saw fit. Microsoft signed the consent decree, its lawyers said, only after
ensuring its "unfettered right to incorporate new features into its operating
systems," according to a declaration by Microsoft's outside counsel, Richard
Urowsky of Sullivan & Cromwell.

At the last minute, negotiators agreed to drop another phrase from the proviso.
The original wording of the phrase was ". . . shall not be construed to prohibit
Microsoft from developing integrated products nor necessarily permit it to do
so." The negotiators later explained their thinking: They were simply deferring
any definition of "integrated" to a later day, not rewriting antitrust law. Yet,
as it stood, Gates apparently believed he had outfoxed the government.

Throughout the summer and fall of 1997, Microsoft's attorneys insisted in a
series of meetings with Justice Department attorneys that the "integrated
products" proviso gave Microsoft a free pass to add Internet Explorer to
Windows. The government was welcome to try its luck with a full-blown Sherman
Act antitrust case, they said. But with the language of the proviso, Klein might
as well give up any thought of a quick victory with a narrow case under the
consent decree, Microsoft's lawyers said. "Don't waste your time on the consent
decree. Look at the language," Bill Neukom, Microsoft's dapper general counsel,
told Klein's lawyers.

To Microsoft, the proviso blessed the company's right to add any features it
chose to its operating system, just as the company had been doing for sixteen
years. Microsoft defined "integrated" the way Webster's Third New International
Dictionary defined it-"combined," "united," or "incorporated into." Under the
company's definition, a product is integrated simply because Microsoft says it
is. In discussions with the government, Microsoft's attorneys famously argued,
were it not for a lack of marketplace demand, the company was free to bundle a
ham sandwich into Windows.

Now Microsoft's confidence was shaken by a federal court judge. "Microsoft's
'unfettered liberty' to impose its idea of what has been 'integrated' into its
operating systems stops at least at the point at which it would violate
established antitrust law," Jackson wrote. To enforce the point, he issued a
preliminary injunction ordering Microsoft to drop its requirement that PC makers
preinstall Microsoft's Internet browser as a condition of licensing Windows.
Even more alarming, the judge's order covered successors to Windows 95. It was
the first time Windows 98 had been formally dragged into the company's antitrust
troubles. Microsoft had even grander plans for using the market power of Windows
98 to boost Internet Explorer.

Nobody had thought it would go that far. "His last paragraph there was very
broad and sweeping, which stunned us," Allchin recalled. Maritz said, "There
were a lot of things in there that I personally found confusing."

The company's high command faced a long weekend of work. Neukom was nominally in
charge of the company's legal strategy. But it was David Heiner who was the
workhorse, serving as project manager for dealing with the Justice Department
and as referee for Microsoft's loud and fast-talking executives. Heiner took
over the boardroom across the hall from Gates's office in Building 8 and turned
it into the war room for gathering input and plotting strategy.

For those who gathered in the boardroom, the legal discussion was a test of
their ability to compartmentalize, a highly prized and necessary skill at
Microsoft. The technology tug-of-war between Allchin and Silverberg and the
legal imbroglio with the government were running in parallel. The two fronts
involved the same set of issues: the relationship of the new phase of technology
evolution, centered on the Internet, with the old phase, centered around
Windows. Throughout the fall, many of the same people-Maritz, Allchin, Chase,
Cole, and of course Gates-were deeply involved in both sets of discussions.
Silverberg, who remained officially on leave, was absent from the legal
discussions.

The group pored over the ruling. In Gates's absence, Steve Ballmer peppered
Heiner with dozens of questions. There were procedural problems with Jackson's
orders, the lawyers explained. When Jackson threw out the contempt claim, that
should have been the end of it. But Jackson had moved on his own to issue a
preliminary injunction. And he had appointed a "special master," a law professor
from Harvard named Lawrence Lessig, to help sort out the issues in what might
well turn into a mini-trial of its own, possibly leading to permanent remedies.
Lessig was beginning to make a name for himself applying constitutional
principles to cyberspace policy disputes. He looked like bad news to Microsoft.

But all that could be taken up later. The preliminary injunction demanded an
immediate response. The group quickly dispatched with the implications for
Windows 98 by deciding to ignore them. There was plenty of time to challenge
them in the six months or so before the expected release of the new operating
system. "We had a discussion that said we specifically weren't going to think
about this," Allchin later told government lawyers. "We're not thinking about
it. March on. In our business we could disrupt a lot of people for nothing in a
situation where time is slipping away on us."

It was not as easy to dismiss the implications for Windows 95. The group
considered a number of ways to easily deactivate Internet Explorer. Microsoft's
own Web sites boasted that "IE uninstalls easily." Perhaps Microsoft could offer
PC makers a version of Windows 95 with the Internet Explorer icon removed from
the desktop and other program menus. Or it could let PC makers use Windows' own
"uninstall" program to remove the browser in the same way a customer might.
That, after all, was what the PC makers were seeking from the beginning.

Ballmer's first instinct was to strike a pose of humility and try to avoid
direct confrontation with the government. Chase, too, favored taking the high
road in the hopes of gradually winning over the company's adversaries with charm
and what he was sure were the merits of Microsoft's arguments. Justice
Department officials were saying they expected to meet with Microsoft's lawyers
within a few days to agree on an approach to satisfy the order. Something could
be worked out.

It was spin-control time. The company's first response was striking in its
moderation. A Microsoft flak, Adam Sohn, a damage-control veteran from the 1992
Clinton presidential campaign, spread good news to reporters. "We think it's a
pretty balanced decision and we're grateful," he said.

Microsoft's press release also accentuated the positive. The company was
"gratified" Jackson did not find the company in contempt. It was "looking
forward" to presenting more evidence. It was "confident" it would prevail. The
press release dismissed as a minor issue the order that Microsoft offer a
browser-free Windows. Microsoft could continue to license Windows 95, the
release stressed, as long as each PC maker "has the option of installing the
portion of Windows 95 that does not include Internet Explorer 3.0 or 4.0 files."
Over the weekend, one Microsoft spokesman told the Wall Street Journal the
company expected to find ways to let PC makers delete Internet Explorer 3.0 and
4.0 files and still allow Windows to function.

When Gates returned from China, he turned the group around and changed the
conciliatory tone. To him, a milquetoast response put Microsoft on the slippery
slope to bankruptcy. The government's suit was an attack on the company's
ability to add features in Windows. Integration was not only a fundamental
principle, it was the basic business strategy Microsoft had pursued since it
licensed its first operating system sixteen years earlier. If PC makers could
pick and choose which parts of Windows to offer and what features to promote on
the desktop screen, they could cut deals with Microsoft's competitors to
gradually displace Windows.

That was why he had pushed so hard in the negotiations over the 1995 consent
decree to secure the exception for integrated products in the first place. Now
it was time to take advantage of his foresight.

At stake were all the company's plans for Windows Everywhere. It wasn't only
about the browser war, where the momentum had shifted in Microsoft's favor such
that the company could probably afford to let PC makers delete the Internet
Explorer icon, or even the browser itself, without significant harm. But what
about the Windows media player, which competed with the streaming video player
from Real Networks? Or voice recognition, where IBM was strong? Or some other
technology in the future? "Their position is that every major thing we've done,
every major thing we're planning to do, should be blocked," Gates said later.

Gates considered the alternatives. At the end of his sixteen-page memorandum,
Jackson's one-paragraph order was vague on exactly what Microsoft was required
to do. All it said was that Microsoft must stop its practice of licensing
Windows on the condition PC makers also license and install "any Microsoft
Internet browser software."

Jackson, in his longer memorandum, though not in the order itself, referred to
the "software code that Microsoft itself now separately distributes at retail as
Internet Explorer 3.0." Government prosecutors also referred to the retail
product in their request for action. The government's imprecision in defining
exactly what it meant by "browser" was to be a recurring issue in the case.
David Cole had submitted an affidavit attesting to the fact that IE 3 and
Windows 95 shared a number of files needed by the operating system even to boot
up, or start, properly. Removing all of the IE 3 files would "break" Windows, he
had said.

Gates wanted to know what would happen if Microsoft adopted the most extreme,
hyperliteral reading of the order? What if the company were to comply with
Jackson's order by offering PC makers a version of Windows stripped of every
line of code that also appeared in Internet Explorer? PC makers would have the
option of installing a broken version of Windows 95, free of Internet Explorer.
Microsoft could comply with the letter of the order and demonstrate the
absurdity of the government's position at the same time.

Gates, a lawyer's son, was ferocious in legal debates. Microsoft's attorneys
needed all their self-confidence and legal experience in order to keep up with
his ability to instantly understand and apply the  law. Microsoft's internal
discussions are typically fast, loud, and "high-bandwidth"-a phrase borrowed
from telecommunications conveying high praise for the volume of information that
could be exchanged rapidly.

The pedantic, formal style of Richard Urowsky, Microsoft's outside counsel,
couldn't be more different, but Gates had immense respect for his legal
abilities. In the boardroom, Urowsky's ponderous voice came over the
speakerphone from Washington, D.C.

"Bill." There was a long pause. "Bill." Another pause. "This is Richard."
Urowsky's trademark interruption was one of the few ways to slow one of Gates's
hundred-mile-per-hour rants. The ploy worked marvelously, shutting Gates up and
making him smile at the same time.

Microsoft's lawyers agreed that under the strictest possible interpretation of
Jackson's ruling, Microsoft could argue that it was required to offer a version
of Windows stripped of any of the code also used in the retail version of IE
3.0. Microsoft could argue that the simplest method of "removing" IE was barred
under the injunction-simply letting PC makers remove the IE icon, or use the
"uninstall" feature, because both of those methods left much of the underlying
code in place. If the goal of Microsoft's defense was to protect the principle
that Microsoft can integrate new functionality into Windows, why offer
alternatives that might not comply with the judge's order but could put fetters
on Microsoft's unfettered ability to integrate?

The group also was aware that giving PC makers a choice between the status quo
and a commercially worthless product might not have been what Judge Jackson
quite had in mind. It was never a good idea to anger a federal judge.

The proposal sat on the boardroom table, like a bomb ready to  go off.

"We're going to look terrible. We're going to look terrible. We're going to look
terrible," warned some people in the room, Ballmer told me later. "I'm in the
group of people who understood, we're not going to look good." Ballmer was still
recovering from the fallout that followed his "To heck with Janet Reno!"
outburst at a Microsoft sales event a month earlier. Microsoft could take a hard
line and make its point, but Ballmer wanted to know, What is the outcome? What
is the collateral damage? Ballmer acknowledged, "We agonized over that, looking
bad."

Indeed, the Broken Windows approach was far from the most commonsense
interpretation of the order. The injunction was simply a cease-and-desist order,
a holding action until the court could make  a final determination about whether
Internet Explorer was a sepa- rate product and thus covered by the decree. The
most thoughtful analysis of the whole mess came from Lessig, the brainy Harvard
law professor. Before Lessig's appointment as Jackson's special master was
rescinded by the appeals court on technical grounds, he offered his preliminary
opinion in an eleven-page letter to lawyers on both sides.

Lessig found that the terms of the original decree were the real guide to what
was and was not allowed; Jackson's injunction was simply meant to enforce the
decree. And the plain meaning of the consent decree was to give PC makers a
"zone of sovereignty" from Microsoft, protection for their freedom to choose
competing products. Thus, Microsoft could have met the zone of sovereignty test,
Lessig wrote, by lifting the provisions that restricted the freedom of PC makers
to remove or disable the code that enabled the browser's functions. "If
Microsoft simply said, with respect to IE, 'You are free,' Microsoft would be in
compliance."

In contrast, Microsoft's all-or-nothing stance did nothing to set PC makers
free. Microsoft interpreted the injunction that PC makers couldn't be forced to
take all of Internet Explorer as meaning they couldn't take any of it, even the
parts required to make Windows work. The requirement that PC makers either take
the full Internet Explorer/Windows 95 bundle or remove every last bit of code
didn't leave PC makers "free to choose about the package of products they will
offer to customers," the plain meaning of the consent decree, Lessig wrote.

Setting PC makers free was the last thing Microsoft wanted to do. The
"IBM-compatible" PC industry grew up around Microsoft's central role in defining
the operating system platform; Microsoft treated PC makers less as partners and
more as mere distributors for Windows. Now the PC makers wanted to rebalance the
relationships with Microsoft, promote their brands as unique, and take advantage
of their relationships with customers to expand their razor-thin profit margins.
Microsoft would become just one of several parts suppliers for their PCs.

From Microsoft's perspective, any new relationship that let PC makers go their
own way would weaken Microsoft's hold on software developers, who wrote programs
for Windows because it was installed so widely. "The minute we give up the
contractual hooks, we fragment the platform and we lose the value of the unified
platform," Raikes, then the number-two sales executive, told me later.

Maybe there was room for compromise. As the weekend wore on, Maritz and others
jumped in, favoring moderation. Maybe hard core wasn't the right approach in
this situation, they said. This is a federal judge, not a software competitor.
Things could get worse, a lot worse. At a minimum, the company was looking at
three months of disastrous PR. Can't we just get this over with? some executives
pleaded.

"It was an incredibly awkward, no-win situation," remembers Chase.

Gates continued to argue for the high-risk, high-reward response. If Windows and
IE were "integrated," they were home free. To him, there was no better way to
prove Windows is an integrated product than to show that it broke when Internet
Explorer was removed. "We have to maintain the absolute right to design software
as we see fit," he argued. This was a great way to slam home that point.

Gates's proposal drew supporters, including Allchin. Ballmer insisted later that
Gates's viewpoint was not "substantively different" than that of the rest of the
group. Nobody argued that the Broken Windows approach wasn't risky. Everybody
knew the company would certainly take a public relations hit.

Still, Gates said, "I want to go for this." The clincher in his argument: If
Microsoft followed the letter of the ruling, it would help its case on appeal.

"We all agreed with Bill and braced ourselves for the fallout," said one
participant.

On Monday morning, Microsoft offered the stripped-down version of Windows. To
soften its stance, the company also agreed to make available a two-year-old
version of Windows 95 that was released at retail before Internet Explorer was
added to the product. PC makers would not be given any new flexibility to use
the more commonplace methods to remove the browser functions or the icon.

The fallout was immediate. Dan Gillmor, in his column in the San Jose Mercury
News, called it "compliance with a raised middle finger." The Justice Department
claimed the response made an "absolute mockery" of the preliminary injunction
and went back to court to again seek a contempt citation. Microsoft employees
visiting home for the holidays were suddenly forced to defend the integrity of
what had long been one of the country's most respected companies. "It's very
painful when you go home and your son asks, 'Daddy, why is the government suing
Microsoft?' " said Anthony Bay, one of the middle managers who had attended the
Power Lab workshop.

Ballmer acknowledged the damage. "It left us in a position where a lot of people
are questioning our company, whether it's a moral company, a proper company,
respectful company," he told me. The negative feeling from customers and others
in the industry was clear "and has certainly not been lost on any of us," he
said. The company convened focus groups and found a noticeable negative turn.
"The number of people enthusiastic about the company, the products, who would
recommend, or would buy them, has clearly taken a dip. It's not cataclysmic. But
it's clear."

The response also damaged Microsoft's credibility with Judge Jackson. He had
ordered Microsoft only to "cease and desist" from the company's own practice. He
hadn't prescribed the particulars of the new licensing terms the company should
adopt. He later said he considered Microsoft's response so "untrustworthy" it
colored his view of the company for the next two years.

"I found their compliance to be less than genuine," he said.

Cole was deployed to receive Jackson's wrath. In court a few weeks later,
Jackson asked incredulously, "It seemed absolutely clear to you that I entered
an order that required you distribute a product that would not work? Is that
what you're telling me?"

Cole was a good soldier. "In plain English, yes," Cole told Jackson. "We
followed that order. It wasn't my place to consider the consequences of that."

Gates insisted that he had had no choice but to remove every line of code that
also appeared in the retail version of the browser. And the court of appeals
later found that Microsoft's interpretation was indeed plausible.

"We did exactly what the order said to do. There was no freedom or flexibility,"
Gates said at a public event a month after the episode. "What did people say
about that? How were we treated on that? Brutally, just brutally."

"I was not sitting there going, 'Ha, ha, I'll do what I want.' I was sitting
there going, 'This is the worst thing that's ever happened to me. When can I get
back to just focusing on developing software?' And then to have the press come
out and say, you know, what it said, that felt bad."

Copyright (c) 2001 by David Bank

***Pointers

For further reading, see Scripting News for August 14, 2001.

http://scriptingnews.userland.com/backissues/2001/08/14

A free public discussion group is running on Yahoo, including the author of the
book.

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/breaking-windows

Dave Winer

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\
-----------------
(c) Copyright 1994-2001, Dave Winer. http://davenet.userland.com/.
"There's no time like now."

A heads-up, we have received permission from the publisher and author of
Breaking Windows, to run an excerpt tomorrow through DaveNet. This is the
first time we've run a book excerpt, and it's a great book to start with.

The author, David Bank, a reporter with the Wall Street Journal, sifted
through a huge volume of email written by Microsoft execs that was made
public during the antitrust trial. Banks' careful reading of these emails
pieces together a picture of Microsoft while it was fighting the browser war
and Java war, that is unprecedented.

In tomorrow's excerpt Bank tells the story of Microsoft's decision to comply
with a judge's order to open up Windows to other browsers by breaking
Windows, an act of self-defacement that illustrates how far Microsoft will
go before bending to authority. I was at Microsoft the day this happened,
and remember discussing it with people there. A line was crossed for many of
us in this event.

You can read a preview of the excerpt here:

http://davenet.userland.com/2001/08/13/excerptFromBreakingWindows

It'll go out as a DaveNet piece tomorrow morning. I believe it's the most
illuminating and important book you can read in 2001 if you're part of the
computer, software or Internet industry. Of course I make no money from the
book -- so I can ask you to help promote it. Make tomorrow a more
interesting day for people who care about the future of our industry, and
help gain visibility for this very important book.

Thanks!

Dave Winer

adam@... wrote:

>
> They support all those operating systems because they *have* to, not
> because they *want* to.

Say what you want, but the facts are that IBM products give them you a choice
of operating systems, Microsoft products hardly do.

> > Just imagine how succesfull Microsoft would be if Microsoft
> products ran across multiple competing platforms (and don't bring the "Mac"
>
> example, I mean x86 operating systems that challenge windows).
>
> Microsoft would be less successful if it did this. The incremental
> cost of doing the work would be more than the extra revenue.

They "incremental cost of doing multi-platform software" is highly
over-rated.
The cost of porting MICROSOFT applications, developed with MICROSOFT current
tools
is high.

However, that doesn't mean it is technically feasible to DESIGN applications
for easy portability.
Look at StarOffice. What Stardivision Gmbh did back in the early 90s before
beign purchased by
Sun was to design a set of libraries that allowed delivering their
application across operating systems
with the same look and feel without having to re-write the application from
scratch on each platform.

> That is why having Windows with such a high market share is a huge benefit
> for Microsoft. How come so few companies port their apps to non-Windows
> platforms?

#1) Ignorance of the technologies available and design techniques that make a
cross-platform application possible.
#2) The application was first designed "for windows" with Microsoft tools,
and that makes porting a very hard task.
#3) FUD (Fear Uncertainty and Doubt) over Java, spread by the press with the
help of Microsoft.


> Because Microsoft is paying them all off, or because it doesn't make
> business sense to do so? This is why if
> Microsoft's applications group was split off it would *not*  automatically
> port Office to Linux, xBSD, etc. despite the fantasies of the open source
> community.

That shows how far the "not invented here" syndrome runs inside the company.
However when they see people moving to cross platform alternatives
(StarOffice/OpenOffice, Netscape/Mozilla, etc), I'm sure their arrogance will
be lowered.


> > The same applies to Sun's StarOffice, it runs in Windows, Linux, Solaris,
> and OS/2. And any software made according to the "100% Java" specs actually
> runs on multiple operating system. This is good for the end user (customer)
> and  the seller.
>
> Was it good for end users that Netscape self-destructed?

Oops, you didn't answer my question. Answering a question with a question
must mean you don't have an answer.

> Because cross-platform support and belief in Java was the main reason that
> it did.

Oh really? And it wasn't because Microsoft "cut their air supply" by giving
out for free the products that Netscape used to SELL, and hence cutting their
revenue stream? I think Microsoft's internal emails taken by the DOJ show
otherwise....

> You are obviously not the typical Microsoft customer. Most people
> don't use 5 different operating systems in a year. Do you really
> think most people want "operating system freedom of choice"?!?!?

My point was not that "users want 5 operating systems". My point was that
creating applications in Java that run seamlessly across diferent operating
systems is a REALITY and can be done with very little effort (and without
going bankrupt), despite Microsoft's FUD claims on the contrary.

Regards
Fernando

My point was that cross-platform development and Java are not magic,
there are tradeoffs. Doing cross platform work means you have less
time to focus on one single platform. Opting to target a middleware
layer limits the features of your app to what that layer supports. So
Microsoft, *as an applications company*, has (generally) chosen not
to do so and write native apps instead.

Now many would say that this is because the apps group is being
pressured by the operating systems group, and I am saying that there
are valid business reasons for the apps groups to behave this way.
Now in "Breaking Windows" it showed this kind of independence
eventually being straightened out by a decision from Bill, but that
was because it involved a direct conflict (only one team could own
the browser). In cases like "what platforms does the apps group
target," once you get to the vice president level they can basically
do what they want.

- adam

--- In breaking-windows@y..., "Dave Winer" <dave@u...> wrote:
>
> About Netscape self-destructing, eight judges agree that Netscape's
demise
> was at least partially caused by Microsoft breaking the antitrust
laws,
> something developers notice as well.
>
> Dave

>>How come so few companies port their apps to non-Windows platforms?
Because Microsoft is paying them all off, or because it doesn't make
business sense to do so?

Microsoft has been losing tons of developers to:

1. Java.

2. Open source. (ie Unix)

3. The Web.

Developers aren't as stupid as Microsoft's business model makes them out to
be. They noticed that all the non-Microsoft apps withered and died in
competition with the platform vendor, and that no one but Microsoft was
making money in markets that Microsoft wanted.

About Netscape self-destructing, eight judges agree that Netscape's demise
was at least partially caused by Microsoft breaking the antitrust laws,
something developers notice as well.

Dave

--- In breaking-windows@y..., Fernando Cassia <fcassia@c...> wrote:
> I don't agree. You can give customers a choice, and you will win
them more
> than by "locking them".
> Take a look at IBM. I can run IBM's own DB2 database in my chocie of
> operating system:
>
> -Any Linux distribution
> -Microsoft Windows
> -IBM's own OS/2
> -IBM's own Aix.
> -Sun's Solaris
>
> That means you CAN support your competitor's operating system. It
all depends
> if your goal is to "dominate the market" (=killing your
competition), or just
> delivering solutions that adapt to the customer's choice of
operating system.

Right, but how much extra work is it for IBM to do that. How many
people run DB2 on OS/2 right now, compared to how much work IBM has
to put in to get it working on that platform, test it, support it,
etc. Is that the best use of their money? They support all those
operating systems because they *have* to, not because they *want* to.
Anyway lock-in works from the bottom up, not top down, so IBM can
only lock in above the layer it owns (DB2). It can't lock in an OS
with an application. It is indeed locking in DB2 customers because
they have DB2 databases and stored procedures and other hooha that is
above DB2. Does IBM make it real easy to replace a DB2 installation
with Oracle, if customers ask for that?

> Just imagine how succesfull Microsoft would be if Microsoft
products ran
> across multiple competing platforms (and don't bring the "Mac"
example, I
> mean x86 operating systems that challenge windows).

Microsoft would be less successful if it did this. The incremental
cost of doing the work would be more than the extra revenue. That is
why having Windows with such a high market share is a huge benefit
for Microsoft. How come so few companies port their apps to non-
Windows platforms? Because Microsoft is paying them all off, or
because it doesn't make business sense to do so? This is why if
Microsoft's applications group was split off it would *not*
automatically port Office to Linux, xBSD, etc. despite the fantasies
of the open source community.

> The same applies to Sun's StarOffice, it runs in Windows, Linux,
Solaris, and
> OS/2. And any software made according to the "100% Java" specs
actually runs
> on multiple operating system. This is good for the end user
(customer) and
> the seller.

Was it good for end users that Netscape self-destructed? Because
cross-platform support and belief in Java was the main reason that it
did.

> In the meantime, I run java applications on 5 different operating
systems on
> a daily basis. I like freedom of choice. Microsoft doesn't, because
their
> whole business model comes from 2 key points: milking their
two "cash cows"
> (Windows and Office), and the forced upgrade cycles.

You are obviously not the typical Microsoft customer. Most people
don't use 5 different operating systems in a year. Do you really
think most people want "operating system freedom of choice"?!?!? What
most people want is to have their computer work well enough so they
can accomplish some task and get home in time to catch "Who Wants to
be a Millionaire".

- adam

Thanks for your reply, Adam, I appreciate it. I've been out of town so
I'm just now replying.

I can see how this client lock-in effect has played out and it's so
obvious once you point it out. It seems almost a basic market effect and
would be difficult to prevent if from happening even if you wanted to.
If consumers are free to chose (and they really are here in the US) and
they chose to all use a common platform, well, you can't legislate away
basic consumer behavior.

Of course, they have legislated competition into the phone business! I
didn't really like the results of that, though. For example, in the area
of cell phones, I've waited until the business started consolidating so
I could get a service that I'd be able to use anywhere and wouldn't have
to worry about it becoming unavailable I 6 months.

I think most consumers are like me; they sit back and wait for the
competing standards to shake out. Once one of them looks like it's going
to be the clear winner, we go out and buy that one.
--
David Goggin
  -- david.goggin@...


-----Original Message-----
From: adam@... [mailto:adam@...]
Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2001 10:40 AM
To: breaking-windows@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [breaking-windows] Re: review of "Breaking Windows" on slashdot

--- In breaking-windows@y..., "David G. Goggin" <david.goggin@a...>
wrote:
>
> Not working in the computer biz, perhaps you can tell me, is this
> lock in strategy pervasive? Do all software companies do this, or
try
> to? Is it accepted as the basic way of doing business in the
software
> arena?

I would say that almost all *successful* companies do it, although
not all of them do it intentionally.

"Lock in" or "network effects" is common in a lot of areas, one of
the most famous being the VHS vs. Beta tape format battle. Once VHS
got a slight lead, it magnified itself and Beta died as a home format.

There are of necessity a lot of standards in computing, and lock in
really is just a widely-used standard that someone has figured out
how to make money from. For example, VHS winning didn't make money
for one company because it was an open standard. Now imagine if
someone owned the rights to TCP/IP and got a little $$ every time
someone sold a copy. Of course TCP/IP probably wouldn't be the
standard it is in that case.

One case playing out now is those flash memory cards used by digital
cameras and camcorders (like the Sony Memory Stick). If one becomes a
standard, it will drive sales of other devices (like picture
printers) that use it. But will this happen if one company owns the
standard? We shall see.

As we move into the networked computing world, there is a fact that
bears noting: It is much easier to use a client to lock in a server
than the other way around. This is why Oracle could not use its
database strength to sell the Network Computer, Sun can't push Java
into the desktop, Novell couldn't get DR-DOS going, and companies
selling things like routers and network storage have so much trouble
maintaining market share. Meanwhile AOL (with their client) can lock
lots of people into its servers, and Netscape with the browser was
such a threat to Microsoft.

Microsoft of course has the ultimate client right now in Windows and
is using that to sell SQL, Exchange, etc. This "server can't lock in
client" rule also means that Microsoft's alleged current strategy, of
using Hailstorm (a server app) to lock in .NET plumbing pieces like
Windows XP, won't work according to me (they need to get .NET
established first, then use that to sell Hailstorm). It is also why
Brad Silverberg, in "Breaking Windows", wanted so badly to own the
browser as part of Megaserver.

- adam



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Thanks for your question. Your question on "Java vs C#"  is based on a common misunderstanding.

Java is MUCH more than a programming language. It is also a cross-platform runtime environment.

Consider a "java virtual machine" like a "micro-operating-system" on top of which java applications are run, regardeless of the underlying operating system.

Of course, Java started beign used for small "applets" that ran inside web pages. But that was only the begginning. Then came the "Java Virtual Machine" for operating systems (Windows, Unix, Linux, OS/2, Mac). This allows running Java _APPLICATIONS_ (as opposed to "applets" on web pages) on the users' desktop.

And at some point in time, only browsers had a "java virtual machine". But then IBM released the first (to my knowledge) operating system with a bundled java VM: OS/2 Warp 4.0 (1996). And others followed (like Apple), and now there are both official (Sun's), Licensed (IBM's), and third party (Kaffe, Blackdown.org)  JVMs for most operating systems. In fact, in some like Windows and Linux, you have a CHOICE of what java virtual machine to run (Microsoft's, Sun's or IBM's).

The decision of microsoft to remove Java, as a result of the trial with Sun, is irrelevant, as I'm 100% sure IBM and Sun will continue providing compliant Java Virtual Machines for the Windows platform.

But to answer your question more directly: the new C# is JUST a programming language, it competes with Sun's J2EE (java 2 Enterprise Edition), as a way to develop multi-tier SERVER and Enterprise applications (think about the back-end of a web store, for example). C# does NOT compete with Java as an application environment.

Tony Goodhew, Product Manager for Visual C++ at Microsoft, states the official Microsoft line on C# nicely. "Basically C# is the first component oriented language in the C/C++ family.

But Java is MORE than a programming language, as I stated above.

I can download Sun's java2 runtime (aka "virtual machine") for Windows on my windows systems.
IBM's JDK 1.3 for OS/2 in my PCs running IBM OS/2
Apple's JRE for MacOS in a Mac (if I had any, I don't)
Blackdown's or IBM's JRE for Linux in my linux systems,

and install a SINGLE version of any of the following (as an example) 100% Java applications on a shared drive, and run each  across desktops running different operating systems, without modification:

- Polarbar, a VERY nice (and 100% java) pop3/imap4 mail client with some nice features ( LINK )
- Moneydance, a Quicken-like personal finance application, but totally cross-platform (LINK )
- JavaLayer, the Java MP3 player (yes, an mp3 player written as 100% cross-platform java, same program runs unmodified on any java2-enabled O/S like Mac/linux/windows/etc). (LINK)
- CrushFTP, the Java ftp server (LINK)
- VNC for java (remote-control your desktop from any java enabled pc). (LINK )
- Jnapster (a 100% java napster client implementation) ( LINK )
- FURI, the Java Gnutella client for sharing all types of files. ( LINK )
- PhotoMesa, my favorite image browser (LINK)

...and dozens more that I'm just too tired to lookup the url now.

Now a question for you: Can I do the same now with C#?: what C# graphical (GUI) desktop applications are available? where is the C# runtime environment for OS/2, Linux, FreeBSD, Solaris and other x86 platforms that compete with Windows ??.

The answer is: ZERO, nothing, nada. And given Microsoft's past record, I'm sure C# will become in the end "Windows only" or perhaps "windows and other microsoft-blessed operating systems like a few select versions of Unix" technology, with Windows always having the advantage and the rest of the operating systems playing catch-up with MSFT.

The Java developers will look at C# with the same suspicion they have always looked at MSFT's "java efforts". That's why the vast majority of developers have stated repeatedly in polls of the independent magazine Java Developers' Journal (JDJ) that they are not interested in Microsoft's view of Java as a "Windows-only" development solution (in other words, polluting Java code with win32 api calls), which defeats the whole purpose of cross-platform compatibility that Sun envisioned when creating it.

Would they trust Microsft with C# now? I really doubt it. It's all a matter of trust. And trust can't be bought, you have to win it.

So, my conclusion: C# is a programming language, geared towards a different target and purpose, which is competing with J2EE (Java2, Enterprise Edition), on the high-end enterprise/ebusiness market. (on the server side).

That is the base of your confusion: thinking about Java as "just a programming language" (that's the idea MSFT tried to promote to "pollute java". Basically if you coded a MS J++ application with "native win32 API calls" as microsoft suggested, then the resulting application ran only in windows. So why code it in J++ after all, if the result application will be windows-only? Native C++ code is much better for native apps...).

In the other hand, the power and beauty of "100% Java" applications is their instant multi-platform availability without re-compiling a single line of code.

Regards

Fernando Cassia
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Author of the "Running Java Apps in OS/2" FAQ

Gerhard Poul wrote:

Is / in which sense is Java open?
Do you think C# is more open?

> The only company activelly against Java is Microsoft. I think
> that tells you
> all about it.
>
> In the meantime, I run java applications on 5 different operating
> systems on
> a daily basis. I like freedom of choice. Microsoft doesn't, because their
> whole business model comes from 2 key points: milking their two
> "cash cows"
> (Windows and Office), and the forced upgrade cycles.

IMHO this issue is also raised in "Breaking Windows" but I'd like to discuss
this whole issue.

Is / in which sense is Java open?

Do you think C# is more open?

Since we are talking about ourselves and I love to boast

hands on
MS-DOS 1.0 (yes the one without sub directories), 3.0/5.0/6.2/6.22, Windows
3.1/3.11/NT4/95/98/2K/ME
Linux Slackware/Red Hat, three different kernels
Unix AT&T/Digital, IRIX, Solaris, BeOS

hands on
IBM PC, IBM PC XT, AT,  286 ,386, 486 SX/DX2/DX4, P 66/100/133/200/ P II
450/500

hands on
BASIC on Commodore 64, BBC Micro and DOS, C on DOS/UNIX, C++ on DOS/UNIX,
Sybase on UNIX, SQL on Windows NT, VB, eMbedded VB.

Coming back to the issue at hand

tell me one compelling reason why Microsoft should be broken?

because Sun does not like it? or AOL does not like it? or because the
customer does not like it? let me tell you the customer loves it, so what is
your problem? why is it the techies fear Windows? Is it because it takes
away too much power from the geek and gives it to the user? With so many
people working on Linux, why is it still un-usable for the common person?
Why do people want to stop the launch of WinXP? is it becuase it restricts
consumer choice? forced upgrades? do they ask you to upgrade or else?

Why is it that Sun refuses to open Java to the standards body? Why did AOL
refuse interconnections from other networks to AIM? Why is the default page
on Navigator set to home.netscape.com? MS restricts consumer choice. are you
sure?

If you don't like Microsoft don't use any of their products. Vote with your
wallet.

PS: BTW the sites I put up have no 404's
PPS: and if you think parenting in India is done looking at websites, don't
make me laugh, I have the Indian Readership Survey in front of me and it
tells me that internet penetration in this country is just under 0.4%.
Besides haven't you heard? reading is a dying habit. Belive me I know, we in
the newspaper biz worry about it all the time.
PPPS: If you want to believe everything I put up on the site, you are
welcome. I'm a newsgroup veteran.
PPPPS: I'm not from Microsoft or any associated company nor am related to
anyone in Microsoft or have any business relations with Microsoft.

I apologise to the group. I guess this is a closed forum open only for
Microsoft bashing. I'll go into silent mode, till I see something more
useful. .

and finally, Netscape 6.1 is not about to kill IE6 + OE6, whether you like
it or not.

Chirag
--
cpatnaik@...
primus inter pares

Information is Power:
Learn to: Gather it; Trade it; Use it.




_________________________________________________________
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Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

Dear Chirag,

I guess you had a bad day.

Chirag Patnaik wrote:

> I just have one question "Were you discussing when you
> had an advertisment sig like that?"  If so, I have
> every right to post comments on the same.

So this is a "pissing contest", right? "you touch my loved company, I'll jump
all over you"?

Advertisement sig?. That's MY signature. I like the new Netscape 6.1 browser,
I really disliked the previous release and I voiced my concerns about it. But
the developers have improved it, and now that's the product I choose on my
most powerful computers (I leave Communicator on slower ones like this
notebook). And I like the effort behind the open source mozilla project too.
I am not related with Netscape Corp or AOL. Are you related in any way to
Microsoft?

Sorry if the mention of a non-microsoft product irritated you. Is this the
rule of this list? "Non-microsoft products cannot be mentioned in taglines or
signatures"?. If so, I will comply. No problem. Just tell me that you are the
admin of this list, and I'll obey.


> And the bottom line is that for most users Microsoft are easier to use.
> I've heard that a Mac is easier,
> but I really couldn't say, because it much to expensive to buy.

I don't want to offend you, but you sound like a newcomer to the IT field.
I've started 15 years ago on the 8bit computers, programming in 6502
assembler, and passed thru most of the 16bit, the first graphical operating
systems and shells for dos, and now run 5 different operating systems,
INCLUDING windows.

But, see, you've drifted the topic and now I'm on the defensive talking about
me, instead of talking about Microsoft, antitrust law, and the IT
marketplace. I thought **that** was the purpose of this list.

> What is a dissapointment is that people come with an
> Microsoft Bashers attitude.

Mine would be a "Microsoft bashers attitude" if I didn't back my position on
microsoft with FACTs and my personal first-hand experience.

I just wanted to give the list a greeting and an introduction about my
background. I stated the reasons why I dislike Microsoft's attitude in the
marketplace, based on MY EXPERIENCE with the company and their products.

Want to deny history?. Want to pretend that the "Barkto Incident" involving a
MSFT manager smearing the competition and faking as an end-user never
happened?. Or more recently, that a Microsoft employee never disguised as an
IT analyst to smear AOL's AIM? Or that windows 3.1 beta didn't specifically
check for dr-dos and gave an ugly error message that scared users away from
the competing operating system? or that microsoft didn't try to present a
fake video as evidence on the DOJ trial? Fine!.

However, I will stick to the facts, and my experience. Let's see who ends up
with more credibility... me, or Steve Ballmer when he says "Open Source is a
cancer". Or when another MS exec announces with fanfarre the opening of the
desktop, and 15 days later says the aol icon on compaq's desktop "takes
choice away from users'.

Do you guys in India have that fable about the Sheperd's boy and the wolf?. I
think so... http://www.indiaparenting.com/stories/aesop/af074.shtml

Well, I guess some MS execs are at the risk of losing all credibility.

Finally, if all you did in IT was learn on Microsoft-sponsored classes and do
Windows-only development, of course you will have a rosy view of Microsoft in
the IT world.

Thanks for your attention, too.

Fernando Cassia
Buenos Aires, Argentina

> Thanks for your attention.
>
> Regards
> Chirag
> =====
> primus inter pares

--- Fernando Cassia <fcassia@...> wrote: >
I hope your message does not show the level of
> discussion on this list.
> What a disappointment.


Without dragging this beyond this one reply.

I just have one question "Were you discussing when you
had an advertisment sig like that?"  If so, I have
every right to post comments on the same.

And the bottom line is that for most users Microsoft
are easier to use. I've heard that a Mac is easier,
but I really couldn't say, because it much to
expensive to buy. Netscape may be easier, but then it
is a matter of preference. You expressed yours I
expressed mine.

What is a dissapointment is that people come with an
Microsoft Bashers attitude.

Thanks for your attention.

Regards

Chirag


=====
--
primus inter pares

____________________________________________________________
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Get your free @yahoo.co.uk address at http://mail.yahoo.co.uk
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--- Fernando Cassia <fcassia@...> wrote: >
I hope your message does not show the level of
> discussion on this list.
> What a disappointment.


Without dragging this beyond this one reply.

I just have one question "Were you discussing when you
had an advertisment sig like that?"  If so, I have
every right to post comments on the same.

And the bottom line is that for most users Microsoft
are easier to use. I've heard that a Mac is easier,
but I really couldn't say, because it much to
expensive to buy. Netscape may be easier, but then it
is a matter of preference. You expressed yours I
expressed mine.

What is a dissapointment is that people come with an
Microsoft Bashers attitude.

Thanks for your attention.

Regards

Chirag


=====
--
primus inter pares

____________________________________________________________
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Get your free @yahoo.co.uk address at http://mail.yahoo.co.uk
or your free @yahoo.ie address at http://mail.yahoo.ie

I don't agree. You can give customers a choice, and you will win them more
than by "locking them".
Take a look at IBM. I can run IBM's own DB2 database in my chocie of
operating system:

-Any Linux distribution
-Microsoft Windows
-IBM's own OS/2
-IBM's own Aix.
-Sun's Solaris

That means you CAN support your competitor's operating system. It all depends
if your goal is to "dominate the market" (=killing your competition), or just
delivering solutions that adapt to the customer's choice of operating system.

Just imagine how succesfull Microsoft would be if Microsoft products ran
across multiple competing platforms (and don't bring the "Mac" example, I
mean x86 operating systems that challenge windows).

The same applies to Sun's StarOffice, it runs in Windows, Linux, Solaris, and
OS/2. And any software made according to the "100% Java" specs actually runs
on multiple operating system. This is good for the end user (customer) and
the seller.

The only company activelly against Java is Microsoft. I think that tells you
all about it.

In the meantime, I run java applications on 5 different operating systems on
a daily basis. I like freedom of choice. Microsoft doesn't, because their
whole business model comes from 2 key points: milking their two "cash cows"
(Windows and Office), and the forced upgrade cycles.

Regards
Fernando

adam@... wrote:

> I would say that almost all *successful* companies do it, although
> not all of them do it intentionally.
>
> - adam

I hope your message does not show the level of discussion on this list.
What a disappointment.


Chirag Patnaik wrote:

> no way
>
> no chance
>
> --
> cpatnaik@...
> primus inter pares
> _________________________________________________________
> Do You Yahoo!?
> Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
> breaking-windows-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

no way

+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
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Supports multiple POP3/IMAP4 + @Netscape.net and @aol.com accounts!
Java2 from Sun. Integrated AIM Instant Messenger module (Optional)
  "The Outlook and IE-Killer". Faster than all previous versions!
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no chance

--
cpatnaik@...
primus inter pares

All truth passes through three stages:
First it is ridiculed.
Then it is violently opposed.
Finally it is accepted as self-evident.



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Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

--- In breaking-windows@y..., "David G. Goggin" <david.goggin@a...>
wrote:
>
> Not working in the computer biz, perhaps you can tell me, is this
> lock in strategy pervasive? Do all software companies do this, or
try
> to? Is it accepted as the basic way of doing business in the
software
> arena?

I would say that almost all *successful* companies do it, although
not all of them do it intentionally.

"Lock in" or "network effects" is common in a lot of areas, one of
the most famous being the VHS vs. Beta tape format battle. Once VHS
got a slight lead, it magnified itself and Beta died as a home format.

There are of necessity a lot of standards in computing, and lock in
really is just a widely-used standard that someone has figured out
how to make money from. For example, VHS winning didn't make money
for one company because it was an open standard. Now imagine if
someone owned the rights to TCP/IP and got a little $$ every time
someone sold a copy. Of course TCP/IP probably wouldn't be the
standard it is in that case.

One case playing out now is those flash memory cards used by digital
cameras and camcorders (like the Sony Memory Stick). If one becomes a
standard, it will drive sales of other devices (like picture
printers) that use it. But will this happen if one company owns the
standard? We shall see.

As we move into the networked computing world, there is a fact that
bears noting: It is much easier to use a client to lock in a server
than the other way around. This is why Oracle could not use its
database strength to sell the Network Computer, Sun can't push Java
into the desktop, Novell couldn't get DR-DOS going, and companies
selling things like routers and network storage have so much trouble
maintaining market share. Meanwhile AOL (with their client) can lock
lots of people into its servers, and Netscape with the browser was
such a threat to Microsoft.

Microsoft of course has the ultimate client right now in Windows and
is using that to sell SQL, Exchange, etc. This "server can't lock in
client" rule also means that Microsoft's alleged current strategy, of
using Hailstorm (a server app) to lock in .NET plumbing pieces like
Windows XP, won't work according to me (they need to get .NET
established first, then use that to sell Hailstorm). It is also why
Brad Silverberg, in "Breaking Windows", wanted so badly to own the
browser as part of Megaserver.

- adam

-- +-----------------------------------------------------------------+
 Message composed & delivered with Netscape 6.1 
Supports multiple POP3/IMAP4 + @Netscape.net and @aol.com accounts!
Java2 from Sun. Integrated AIM Instant Messenger module (Optional)
"The Outlook and IE-Killer". Faster than all previous versions!
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
See it for yourself: Grab the full (pre-release) version at
ftp://ftp.netscape.com/pub/netscape6/english/6.1_PR1/windows/win32/sea/N6SetupB.exe

The flap over Windows XP recalls the Silverberg-Allchin wrestling
match over control of the browser team. There's a brief excerpt in
today's Journal at
http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB997137355841349369.htm
(subscription required).

cheers,

David

Very valuable contribution, especially from a former employee and
former (?) Windows hawk.

Not working in the computer biz, perhaps you can tell me, is this
lock in strategy pervasive? Do all software companies do this, or try
to? Is it accepted as the basic way of doing business in the software
arena?

TIA,
--
David Goggin
  -- david.goggin@...



--- In breaking-windows@y..., "Adam Barr" <adam@p...> wrote:
> My review was just posted this morning:
>
> http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=01/08/04/1524254
>
> - adam

...and there's a link to this discussion site. spread the URL far and
wide.

David

--- In breaking-windows@y..., "David G. Goggin" <david.goggin@a...>
wrote:

> Or argued another way, I don't see how anyone can crack Microsoft's
> grip on the market without the use of antitrust action to open a
> fissure.
>
I don't think we disagree. I argued in the book that in many
ways "the trial was the remedy," in that, with Microsoft's hands
tied, many of its erstwhile partners felt freer to, for example, do
deals with Linux companies. Witness Compaq's latest arrangement with
AOL. So antitrust enforcement is critical to keeping things open.

In the long-term however, customer demand for interoperability (that
is, having the ability to choose any media player, or any
authentication/payment system, or any XML implementation, and have it
work seamlessly with Windows) is likely to be more effective in
limiting the "lock-in" than retroactive antitrust enforcement.
Additionally, that same demand would be a check on strategic behavior
by AOL, Sun, etc. In the absence of that demand, Microsoft (or
others) claim for the benefits of "integration" are harder to counter.

David

Thank you for such a great book, David. The book is so revealing that
it qualifies as a public service. :-) It has, as Dave Weiner said,
opened my eyes.

I found Mr. Lessig' article useless. He argues for righteous, but
everyone knows that has righteousness has little to do with
dominating the marketplace, and certainly is not of any concern to
Microsoft.

While I appreciate your insightful book, David, I did not agree with
a point you made in your previous post...

--- In breaking-windows@y..., "Bank, David" <david.bank@w...> wrote:
> the best check on
> Microsoft was not antitrust action but consumer demand.

As an armchair quarterback, my best second guessing about this
situation is that antitrust action may well open the door for
competition that ultimately checks MS behavior. Therefore
antitrust action would be, at this point in time, very effective
in limiting MS market abuse. Witness the possibility (comments?) that
Windows XP may be forced to open it's desktop and that AOL will
attempt to take it by storm.

Or argued another way, I don't see how anyone can crack Microsoft's
grip on the market without the use of antitrust action to open a
fissure.

BTW, what's your take on .Net as of today? Do you think MS will
dominate this new market? If they win that market, will they play
fair with their competitors, or will it be "dominate and intimidate"
again?

Thanks!
--
David Goggin
  -- david.goggin@...

Larry Lessig has an interesting piece in the latest Industry
Standard. (The Limits Of Credibility: Microsoft got beat fair and square.
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,28036,00.html?mail=1).

See my response below the excerpt:

<snip>
There are some who believe Microsoft already knows how to follow the law.
They insist the government's case is based on an outdated view of the
company. Microsoft's strategy, these people insist, is no longer the biased
game the court found illegal. It is instead a strategy that is fully
consistent with the court's rule.
This view gains support from an important new book by Wall Street Journal
reporter David Bank . To be published by Free Press this fall, Breaking
Windows tells an extraordinary story about the struggle within Microsoft for
the company's soul. It turns out that Microsoft is more complicated than the
government made it seem. No doubt there is a part keen on preserving and
protecting "Windows" - through techniques that the court of appeals found
illegal. But there is a part as well that believes the future is best
captured through a strategy of neutrality - through products built with
neutral code that doesn't strive at every step to tilt the world to Windows.

We can call these the forces of darkness and light (not to bias this too
much) that rage within the corporation that is Microsoft. The force of
darkness is best captured in a chilling quote that Bank attributes to Bill
Gates, who is reported to have "screamed" at a top lieutenant, Paul Maritz,
"You're putting us on a level playing field! You're going to kill the
company." Gates' strategy was instead to "tax," as Bank describes it, every
Microsoft product to benefit Windows. Every implementation would make it
harder for non-Microsoft products to compete.
The forces of light have a different vision of how Microsoft will best
succeed. This vision is captured in one reading of the company's framework
for the next generation of the Internet, .Net, which will enable a range of
"Web services" that today don't really exist. They will be implemented upon
a "common language runtime" that Microsoft promises it won't game. And
indeed, Microsoft is backing up these promises with a commitment to submit
CLR to a standards body so that anyone can build to CLR without giving
control to Microsoft.
In Bank's account, at least at the time he finished his book, the forces of
light had prevailed. They had convinced the powers that be the best strategy
was neutrality; the best future for Microsoft would be played on a level
playing field.
It will be hard for most in this business to believe this view about what
Microsoft has become...
<snip>
My response to Larry:
	 I may not have been as clear as I would have liked in the
conclusion. What I was trying to argue is that the industry and technology
trends had moved toward interoperability or, as he calls it, neutrality, and
that some inside Microsoft were urging it to accomodate the trend. But many
of those people soon left and Gates appears to have reverted to type. At the
very end, I pose the hope that Gates would "track the inevitable" and lead
the new direction rather than resist it, and that the best check on
Microsoft was not antitrust action but consumer demand. As I understand it,
the battle inside Microsoft rages on...

--David

David,

A friend passed me your book and I found it very interesting. Congrats on an
excellent job.

I wonder if you'd like to tell us what you think your book would say if it
was being published next summer? In other words, what are the kinds of
strategy decisions being made inside Microsoft right now?

Will SmartTags come back? How?

What will Office.NET be like? What are the strategy taxes that are coming to
bear on the decisions being made?

Will the DOJ aim to force Microsoft to divest its Passport/MSN division.

The Talking Moose
http://talkingmoose.manilasites.com

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